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THE BETTER ANGELS OF SELF-
GOVERNMENT
Martin S. Flaherty*
Constitutional interpretation typically travels along one of two
paths. For many, perhaps most, commentators, the Constitution is
about democratic self-government. Thinkers as diverse as Bruce
Ackerman' and Robert Bork,2 Cass Sunstein3 and Antonin Scalia4 at
some deep level believe that the Constitution counts as higher law
because it both reflects and enables the considered decisions of the
American people. Others emphasize that the Constitution, at the end
of the day, promotes justice. Here, such commentators as Ronald
Dworkin5 and Lawrence Sager 6-yet also Richard Epstein7 and John
Finnis-contend that the Constitution embraces a certain substantive
commitment to the good, whether moral theory, Thomistic
philosophy, or economic liberty. Frequently, these democratic and
justice-seeking9 visions complement one another. But as Abner
Greene has suggested, they will conflict."' We the People of the
United States once chose to protect slavery, an institution that no
sound moral theory could uphold. In such situations, citizens, lawyers,
and the Supreme Court must ultimately decide whether the
* Professor of Law and Co-Director, Joseph R. Crowley Program in International
Human Rights, Fordham Law School. An earlier version of this piece appeared
online for H-Law. My thanks to R.B. Bernstein for his help with the earlier project.
1. See, e.g., 1 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (1991); 2 Bruce
Ackerman, We The People: Transformations (1998).
2. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America! The Political Seduction
of the Law (1990).
3. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (1993).
4. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation (1997).
5. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986).
6. See, e.g., Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212 (1978).
7. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of
Eminent Domain (1985).
8. See, e.g., John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (1980).
9. Some might object, and I take it Professor Eisgruber may be among them, to
the term "justice-seeking" on the ground that democracy itself may be a form of
justice. I nonetheless consider the term useful as a way of distinguishing theories that
advocate a substantive version of justice regardless of its democratic foundations from
those that do not.




Constitution rests on the will of the people or the fundamental
demands of justice.
History tags along down each path, though often in different ways.
The past tends to count much more heavily in democratic-based
theories, most famously as evidence for what those who ordained the
Constitution originally meant, intended, or understood. The current
vogue of "originalism" originally sprang from the political right, with
which it remains most commonly associated.1' Yet arguably the best
historical work along originalist lines has issued from elsewhere along
the political spectrum, even if its practitioners reject the label. 2 So
pervasive has this perspective become that Randy Barnett can
plausibly proclaim that "[o]riginalism has not only survived the debate
of the eighties, but it has virtually triumphed over its rivals.
Originalism is now the prevailing approach to constitutional
interpretation. Even more remarkably, it has prevailed without
anyone writing a definitive formulation of originalism or a definitive
refutation of its critics." 3
Justice-seekers may beg to differ about originalism's victory, but
their work also draws upon the past. When deployed in justice-
seeking theories, history has most powerfully appeared as custom or
tradition that reveal how governmental institutions have worked out
or that define and develop the Constitution's fundamental principles
of right. This approach has been comparatively more apparent on the
Supreme Court, particularly in the jurisprudence of Justices
Frankfurter, 4 and the second Harlan. It remains alive, if not always
11. Highlights from a prodigious literature include: Bork, supra note 2; Michael
W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 Va. L. Rev. 947
(1995); Edwin Meese II, Address before the American Bar Association (July 9,
1985), in The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited Constitution,
27 S. Tex. L. Rev. 455 (1986); Antonin Scalia, Address at the University of Cincinnati
as the William Howard Taft Constitutional Law Lecture (Sept. 16, 1988), in
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849 (1989).
12. By now, the literature here is even more prodigious: 1 Ackerman, supra note
1; 2 Ackerman supra note 1; Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American
Constitutionalism, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 523 (1995) [hereinafter Flaherty, History Lite];
Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding,
and Treaties as "Supreme Law of the Land," 99 Colum. L. Rev. 2095 (1999); Lawrence
Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1365 (1997); William Michael
Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power to Declare War, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 695
(1997) [hereinafter Treanor, Power to Declare War]; William Michael Treanor, The
Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 Colum. L.
Rev. 782 (1995).
13. Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 Loy. L. Rev. 611, 613
(1999). For superb overviews, see Laura Kalman, The Strange Career of Legal
Liberalism (1996); Laura Kalman, Border Patrol: Reflections on the Turn to History in
Legal Scholarship, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 87 (1997). For a strong normative dissent, see
Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 381 (1997).
14. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("It is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American
constitutional law to confine it to the words of the Constitution and to disregard the
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well, in substantive Due Process jurisprudence.16 It has also found
powerful new advocates among academics. 7
Christopher Eisgruber's innovative Constitutional Self-
Government8 does not deconstruct these polarities so much as
reconfigure them, often brilliantly. As the title suggests, Eisgruber
ultimately comes down on the side of democracy. He declares at the
outset that he "interpret[s] the Constitution as a practical device that
launches and maintains a sophisticated set of institutions which, in
combination, are well-suited to implement self-government." (p. 3).
Yet for Eisgruber it does not follow that the Court should simply
defer to electoral majorities or the desires of framers and ratifiers. To
the contrary, "the Supreme Court should be understood as a kind of
representative institution well-shaped to speak on behalf of the people
about questions of moral and political principle." (p. 3). Eisgruber's
distinct contribution is to adopt a democratic theory but, in that
context, assign a distinctly justice-minded role to the institution that
most concerns constitutional theorists.
I. DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE
This project requires a thicker, more nuanced conception of
democracy than constitutional theory ordinarily offers. Constitutional
Self-Government delivers just this. Typically, the Constitution is
viewed as a device to limit ordinary democratic process, which itself is
assumed to be ruled by electoral majorities. As such, constitutional
limitations inevitably appear suspect, especially when enforced by
unelected judges. This suspicion has a long, uneven history,19 which
spikes at points such as James Bradley Thayer's pioneering work,"
and Alexander Bickel's "countermajoritarian difficulty."2  Fanning
gloss which life has written upon them.").
15. See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(describing the "rational continuum" for interpreting the Due Process Clause).
16. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-49 (1992); Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986).
17. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History-And Through It, 65 Fordham L.
Rev. 1627 (1997); Larry Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term-Foreword: We the
Court, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (2001) [hereinafter Kramer, We the Court].
18. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government (2001).
19. This history is being comprehensively written by Barry Friedman: The History
of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 333 (1998); The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part
Two: Reconstruction's Political Court, 91 Geo. L.J. 1 (2002); The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1383 (2001); The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law's
Politics, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 971 (2000); The History of the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, Part Five: The Birth of an Academic Obsession, 112 Yale L.J. 153 (2002).
20. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129 (1893).
21. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at
the Bar of Politics (1962).
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the suspicion of constraining ordinary majority rule is what I have
called the "asymmetry" of constitutional discourse. Law professors
are past masters at demolishing one another's theories justifying
constitutional constraint. They are somewhat less rigorous, both by
training and inclination, to challenge comfortable assumptions about
how democratic our representative institutions really are.22
Eisgruber maintains that the conventional emphasis is wrong on all
counts. For starters, "we should regard inflexible written
constitutions, including the American one, as practical, procedural
devices for implementing relatively ordinary, albeit non-majoritarian,
conceptions of democracy." (p. 11). On this view, the Constitution's
many "supermajority" requirements for entrenching higher law are
simply a different way to capture democratic sentiment in areas in
which stability, deliberation, and concern about overreaching by mere
majorities may be especially valued. Simple majoritarianism fails,
moreover, because a government cannot speak on behalf of the
people unless it takes into account "the interests and opinions of all
the people." (p. 50). Likewise, automatic deference to electoral
majorities fails the test of democracy because anonymous voters, who
neither have to give reasons for their actions nor expect their actions
to materially influence outcomes, have little reason to take their
responsibilities seriously. As a democrat, Eisgruber is hardly arguing
that we do away with Congress or local legislatures. But, he does
insist that they have predictable flaws, which is why "national
governments routinely supplement them with other institutions, such
as, for example, independent agencies [and] central banks." (p. 52).
And constitutional courts. Having given a richer account of
democracy, Constitutional Self-Government considers the democratic
role for the Supreme Court and judicial review. One test for this role
is its legitimacy. Here Eisgruber answers that judicial review is not
''an external constraint upon the democratic process," but instead "an
ingredient in the process." (p. 77). At least the Federal courts have
an often unappreciated democratic pedigree through appointment by
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Life tenure,
moreover, produces a certain disinterestedness and sense of moral
responsibility that makes judges comparatively well-suited to deal
with the moral principles that the Constitution's abstract provisions
implicate, whether "freedom of speech," "free exercise of religion," or
"equal protection of the laws." On these points, Eisgruber echoes
some of the judiciary's more longstanding defenses. Hamilton, for
example, long ago famously wrote that life tenure in a republic is "an
excellent barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the
representative body," adding that "it is the best expedient which can
22. See Martin S. Flaherty, Constitutional Asymmetry, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 2073
(2001).
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be devised in any government to secure steady, upright, and impartial
administration of the laws."'23 It is among his contributions to bring
into the open the democratic implications that such statements leave
buried just below the surface.
A legitimate practice may nonetheless not be a desirable one.
Constitutional Self-Government therefore subjects judicial review to a
second test-the charge that it stifles popular activity, demotes
citizens to spectators, and undermines democratic flourishing. To
refine this test, Eisgruber posits several goals for a well-functioning
democracy, including impartiality as to the interests of all the people,
the possibility for effective choice, a certain degree of participation,
and public deliberation. In an especially subtle treatment in a subtle
work, Constitutional Self-Government asserts that there is little
evidence that judicial review undermines any of these objectives. By
taming local majoritarian tyranny, the courts may not only protect
democratic process in the fashion most famously developed by John
Hart Ely,24 but it may also forestall more aggressive intervention by
other bodies such as Congress.
Likewise, the debates generated by cases as various as Roe v.
Wade25 and Dred Scott2 6 suggest that the Court's decisions can
generate as much public deliberation as they purportedly quell. A
mirror image of this challenge runs that the Court cripples what might
otherwise be productive legislative compromise through infecting all
politics with polarizing abstractions. Eisgruber contends that this
argument is so much lawyerly hubris masquerading as humility. Just
as lawyers fancy themselves as instant experts in almost any field,27 so
too they tend to believe that issues such as birth, death, freedom,
equality, and religion could not possibly generate significant political
debate unless courts have weighed in. Of course, these arguments
themselves are counterfactual. We cannot run an experiment to test
the level of democratic flourishing without judicial review. Yet these
arguments do provide sophisticated counters to oft-repeated
assertions that such an experiment would come out against the courts.
II. JUDICIAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
Having addressed whether judges in constitutional cases should
make independent judgments about justice, Eisgruber devotes the
second half of Constitutional Self-Government to how they should do
so. He turns first to judicial method. Here the basic prescription
stresses principle over text, judgment over aesthetics. As Eisgruber
23. The Federalist No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
24. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (1980).
25. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
26. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
27. See Ely, supra note 24, at 56.
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nicely puts it, "[l]awyers, scholars, and judges frequently demand from
the constitutional text more than it can deliver," (p. 111) as if vague
phrases such as "equal protection" or "due process" obviously
compelled specific results. In a salient insight, Eisgruber rightly notes
that these inflated claims for text often rest on the premise that
"constitutional text possesses hidden harmonies that will reveal
themselves to assiduous students and so diminish the need to make
their own judgments about political morality." (p. 113).
These assumptions all but define modern constitutional discourse.
They are certainly pervasive on the Supreme Court, where claims for
the Constitution's capacities can be especially overdone. To take one
example, Justice Thurgood Marshall could declare in Stanley v.
Georgia2" that the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause would be
meaningless unless-as Eisgruber paraphrases it-"that the state
cannot prevent men from titillating themselves at home with filthy
movies." (p. 113). This is not to say that this result is incorrect. But if
it is correct, it surely is not as a function of some holistic theory about
self-expression embedded in the words of the First Amendment.
Rather, Eisgruber insists, Stanley ultimately stands or falls as a
consideration of the American people's best judgment about the
state's power to invade the home to regulate their sexual morality.
More generally, the Due Process Clause has long been notable,
some have said notorious, for effectively specifying an array of
unspecified rights. Again, this result is by no means unjustified. Glib
critics of substantive Due Process jurisprudence, for example,
commonly ignore the possibility that the text, structure, and history of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause could comfortably provide a safe
haven for the unenumerated rights that they decry.29
Professors' assertions are less artless, yet oddly unreal. Eisgruber
convincingly argues that academics are especially susceptible to what
he nicely dubs the "aesthetic fallacy." (p. 113). This form of
misplaced faith in constitutional certainty rests on the premise that the
document has an overarching, elegant coherence all but beyond the
reach of mere mortals." Few commentators illustrate the lure of this
vision better than Akhil Amar. Amar has written extensively from
28. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
29. See Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the
Fourteenth Amendment (1977). But see Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional
Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 Yale L.J. 453, 522-24 & n.139 (1989); John J. Gibbons,
Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment,31
Rutgers L. Rev. 839 (1978) (reviewing Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The
Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment (1977)); Aviam Soifer, Protecting
Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 651 (1979).
30. This is a different sort of perfection than that famously ridiculed by Henry
Monaghan. See Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353
(1981). Whereas Monaghan challenged the idea that the Constitution always
produces politically desirable results, Eisgruber rejects the notion that the
Constitution always reflects intellectually pleasing integrity.
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the premise that nearly every word, indeed nearly every punctuation
mark, in Constitutional text coherently relates to every another in a
mutually illuminating fashion.31 The trick is being clever enough, as
Eisgruber aptly puts it, to "decode" these "hidden textual meanings."
(p. 113). The Ninth and Tenth Amendments, for example, when read
together, reveal that the term "the people" refers neither to the rights
of individuals in the Ninth, nor the rights of the states or collective
peoples of the states in the Tenth, but rather to the people of the
nation in their sovereign capacity to constitute governments. 2
One does not have to be an originalist to suspect not.
Interpretations such as these underestimate the fallibility of human
beings attempting to draft often novel text amidst conflicts, bickering,
haste, and otherwise challenging circumstances.33 They ignore that
punctuation, at least in eighteenth-century text, is as likely to reflect
an expectation of how they were to be read aloud as to indicate
considered changes in meaning." And in this case they overlook the
fact that these two particular texts wound up together not to explicate
a reinforcing doctrine but by sheer accident.35 In his attraction to the
"aesthetic fallacy," Amar is not so much distinctive as simply more
original.36 Commentators who share little else share the conviction
that the Constitution can unlock almost any specific matter, if only
one has the right key. It is to Eisgruber's credit that he admits his own
momentary surrender to aesthetics before moving forward. (pp. 113-
14).
One further way Constitutional Self-Government considers how
judges should declare-or not declare-what the law is turns upon
institutional competence. For Eisgruber, what marks the borders of
31. His most notable articulation appears in Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism,
112 Harv. L. Rev. 748 (1999).
32. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction (1998).
33. Cf Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of
the Constitution 57-93 (1996) [hereinafter Rakove, Original Meanings].
34. See Jay Fliegelman, Declaring Independence: Jefferson, Natural Language &
the Culture of Performance (1993). 1 am indebted to R.B. Bernstein for this
reference.
35. See William Michael Treanor, The Bill of Rights Revisited (manuscript on file
with the Fordham Law Review).
36. One hoary example now often associated with the right is the argument that
because the Article II Executive Vesting Clause lacks the "herein granted" limiting
language of the Article I Legislative Vesting Clause, it follows that Article II grants
the President plenary and originally well-understood and agreed upon executive
authority. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); Steven G. Calabresi &
Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541,
562-63 (1994). For a corrective, see Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch,
105 Yale L.J. 1725 (1996). This same debate has lately reemerged with regard to
foreign affairs power. Compare Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The
Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, Ill Yale L.J. 231 (2001), with Curtis Bradley &




judicial competence is the ability of courts to reduce grand principles
to practical legal rules, mechanisms, institutions, or tests. Borrowing
from Lawrence Sager,37 Eisgruber describes this task as a "strategic"
decisionmaking, because judges will often have significant discretion
in fashioning particular means for realizing constitutionally mandated
principles. (pp. 136-37). Often courts will be fairly good at this sort of
thing. Judges seem most obviously adept at handling matters relating
to litigation, criminal, and civil procedure, and the functioning of the
legal system more generally. In somewhat bolder fashion, Eisgruber
suggests that courts are also adept in handling "discrete" moral
principles that establish constraints on government, such as "persons
should not be penalized for engaging in vigorous criticism of popular
public officials." (p. 170). As an example of both ideas at work,
consider New York Times Co. v. Sullivan," in which the Court
strategically converted just the foregoing, discrete, moral principle
into the "actual malice" doctrine, a mechanism that itself closely
pertains to the litigation process.
Often, however, courts are not especially good at strategic
decisionmaking. This is especially true, Eisgruber suggests, where the
Constitution's moral principles are "comprehensive" in demanding
"that some system, considered as a whole, should treat people fairly."
(p. 170). Such areas include economic justice, voting rights,
federalism, and separation of powers. Put another way, courts are
rarely well situated to make even educated guesses about how best to
structure political, economic, and social systems in ways most likely to
produce just results.
Consider federalism. In several especially penetrating sections,
Eisgruber skewers the bases the Court has invoked in its recent
"states' rights" jurisprudence. It is hardly clear that, considered as a
whole, states in the federal system are more democratically responsive
than the Federal government.39 Or that the structural fact that the
Constitution recognizes two levels of government suggests specific
limitations on national authority.' Or, still less, that the Founders,
who were to a significant extent motivated by the failures of the state
governments,4 sought to create significant, judicially-enforceable,
37. Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: State Courts and the Strategic Space Between
the Norms and Rules of Constitutional Law, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 959 (1985).
38. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
39. Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In
Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 752, 768-69 (1995). But see
Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part lI-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 Colum. L.
Rev. 346, 414 (1990).
40. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918-19 (1997). But see id. at 976-77
(Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Martin S. Flaherty, Are We to Be a Nation? Federal
Power v. "States' Rights" in Foreign Affairs, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1277, 1288 (1999)
[hereinafter Flaherty, Are We to Be a Nation?].
41. For this proposition, see the bulk of the last several decades' work on the
origins of the Constitution. More specifically, sample Rakove, Original Meanings,
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protection of state governments against Federal intrusion.42 For all
these reasons, Constitutional Self-Government convincingly asserts
that there are simply too many contested "ways to make federalism
work, and the choice among these ways will turn upon all sorts of
highly contingent factual judgments and preferences" (p. 198) that
judges are not especially well-positioned to determine-especially in
comparison to the legislature and executive.
III. THE DEATH OF DEAD HAND CONTROL
Professor Eisgruber has earned a reputation as one theorist who has
a healthy appreciation for constitutional history43 and therefore avoids
the pitfalls of what I have elsewhere dubbed "history 'lite.' 44
Constitutional Self-Government thus promises an insightful
consideration of the role that the past should play in the Court's
deliberations, and it does not disappoint. As with his theory in
general, he seeks to navigate between the twin excesses of justice-
seeking and democratic approaches. Eisgruber rejects the notion that
"the dead hand of the past" should trump the contemporary moral
judgments of the living. At the same time, he embraces the idea that
the nation's constitutional history-both noble and tragic-can often
serve as a critical foundation for a judge or justice seeking to fulfill his
or her democratic task of deriving and applying the Constitution's
moral commitments.
For these reasons, Eisgruber has little truck with originalism.
Seeking a broad yet workable definition, he counts as originalist any
theory that in ambiguous cases "dictates that we must comply with a
certain moral view because it was held in the past (when the
Constitution or a relevant amendment was ratified), even though we
now think the view erroneous." (p. 27). Originalism of this sort fails
for at least two sets of reasons. One: as Ronald Dworkin has argued,
even conceding that we should follow the Founders' intent, the only
uncontestable evidence of their views is the Constitution's text itself,
and texts such as "free exercise of religion," "executive power," not to
mention, "the enumeration of certain rights in this constitution should
not be construed to deny other rights retained by the people," are
supra note 33; Gordon S. Wood, Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787
(1969). For a historiographical overview, see Flaherty, History Lite, supra note 12, at
535-49.
42. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
43. A very incomplete list includes: Christopher L. Eisgruber, Dred Again:
Originalism's Forgotten Past, 10 Const. Comment. 37 (1993); Christopher L.
Eisgruber, Early Interpretations and Original Sins, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 2005 (1997);
Christopher L. Eisgruber, John Marshall's Judicial Rhetoric, 1996 Sup. Ct. Rev. 439
(1996); Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Fourteenth Amendment's Constitution, 69 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 47 (1995); Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Living Hand of the Past:
History and Constitutional Justice, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1611 (1997).
44. Flaherty, History Lite, supra note 12, at 523.
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famously abstract.45 Two: constitutional history honestly pursued is
almost always sufficiently messy that it rarely "compels" results in the
way judges sometimes assert. (p. 127).
Yet Constitutional Self-Government does not throw out this
historical baby with the originalist bathwater. A classic example in
this regard is Justice Brandeis's concurrence in Whitney v. California.46
The opinion's reference to the framers selectively mined the Founding
for an account of free speech that was attractive in contemporary
terms rather than faithful to history's complexity. To this many other
examples might be added. In Everson v. Board of Education,47 Justice
Black famously popularized Jefferson's metaphor of a "wall of
separation between church and State,"4 even though the phrase came
over a generation after 1791 from a Founder who was a notoriously
quirky representative of his generation, and who was neither present
nor participated at the Constitutional Convention, the state ratifying
conventions, nor the First Congress that drafted the Bill of Rights.49
More recently, Justice Marshall eloquently invoked the fall of
Richmond during the Civil War to argue that one of the city's modern
affirmative action programs comported with the Equal Protection
Clause, not on narrow originalist grounds but in light of the moral
revolution that the Union's victory helped bring about."' What
Eisgruber says about Whitney applies to each of these invocations.
However selective these appeals to the past may be, they remain
legitimate since history should contribute to constitutional
jurisprudence "as servant, not rival, to justice." (p. 127).
In similar fashion, history as tradition can and has played an even
greater role. Despite cases such as Bowers v. Hardwick,51 the "deeply
rooted American tradition" has often served as a basis for the Court's
recognition of numerous Federal rights, whether through substantive
Due Process or incorporation. In Griswold,52 Roe,53 and Casey,54 even
in Cruzan55 and Glucksberg,56 the sort of reliance on tradition
45. Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe,
and Nerve, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1249 (1997).
46. 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
47. Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
48. Id. at 16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
49. This is not to argue Jefferson's irrelevance by any means. The point is,
however, that statements by Jefferson are to be treated with more care than
arguments put forth by less idiosyncratic advocates such as Madison and Wilson,
especially when the source comes so far after the Constitutional text it is supposed to
illuminate. For a comment on Jefferson's reliability, see Flaherty, Are We to Be a
Nation?, supra note 40, at 1309-10 n.157.
50. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 528-29 (1989) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
51. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
52. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
53. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
54. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
55. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
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commonly associated with Justice Harlan (grand fils) serves as a
central basis for considering the rights at issue. That said, most fair-
minded readers would have to conclude that the rights shape the
traditions-or at least the selective accounts of the traditions-as
much as the traditions ordain the rights.
Eisgruber rightly notes that in part tradition in these instances
serves roughly the same function that the Founding served in Whitney:
persuasive but not binding evidence that a judge's determination is
not idiosyncratic but instead has a plausible basis in the considered
views of the American people. But, Eisgruber argues, tradition also
has an additional role to play in the strategic cashing out of
constitutional principle. To take just one example, a judge seeking to
apply the principle that parents should be able to direct the
upbringing of their children except when contrary to the child's best
interest will usually find it useful to consider how society has
customarily struck the balance, as well as how that balance has
evolved. Yet many traditions-racism, gender subordination-do not
merit contemporary moral recognition no matter how deep their roots
or enduring their existence. "Tradition," like "history," may provide
important data, but such data requires self-conscious interpretation
and evaluation, not blind obedience.
IV. (SOME) PAIN FOR THE CLAIM
Any theory that is substantial and original suggests challenges, and
Constitutional Self-Government is no exception. To start with the
past, Eisgruber's case against originalism is curiously modest. Not for
him are the usual moves that fixing "collective" intent is impossible,57
still less that a given conception of justice should trump a well-
considered democratic outcome, including presumably, an outcome
ordained by "We the People.""s Rather, his indictment has a distinctly
empirical cast despite protestations to the contrary. Originalism fails
as a theory of what words mean because most of the words that matter
are general and appear to invite a turnover of more specific meanings
over time. (pp. 28-35). Originalism fails as a theory about
constitutions limiting future generations to the specific conceptions its
ratifiers desired again, because the words they left behind are
sweeping and it is doubtful that historical inquiry could ever "provide
56. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
57. Compare Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 863, 870 (1930)
(arguing that collective legislative intent is absurd), with James M. Landis, A Note on
"Statutory Interpretation," 43 Harv. L. Rev. 886 (1930) (defending the concept). For a
more recent discussion, see William N. Eskridge Jr., Legislative History Values, 66
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 365 (1990).
58. See Michael S. Moore, Justifying the Natural Law Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 2087 (2001); cf. Larry G. Sagar, Justice in
Plainclothes: A Theory of American Constitutional Law (forthcoming 2003).
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any solid ground for rejecting the hypothesis that the framers
intended to constitutionalize the best understanding of whatever
moral ideals or political concepts they mentioned." (p. 33).
Originalism, finally, fails on the view that the Constitution's central
purpose is to prevent change on the ground that American society
has, on balance, historically progressed rather than declined over the
past two hundred years. (pp. 36-38).
Each of the counts in this indictment are powerful. Yet they are all
in a sense contingent. Most, though not necessarily all, constitutional
terms that today generate controversy seem general. Yet generality
may be in the eye of the modern beholder. Perhaps phrases that
appear to lack specificity to us look that way only because we have
lost a sense in which people from earlier periods thought such phrases
fixed far more limited meanings, as opposed to believing the words to
be general against an array of more specific potential conceptions.
The generality of the text seems to invite continual reassessment. But
what if (however implausibly) no one at the time thought this? Or,
worse, what if everyone comprising We the People affirmatively
rejected the idea of evolving interpretation, thus foreclosing the
option of we the living opting for a more attractive reading on the
ground that the document's abstract phrases might allow such an
interpretation? Twenty-first-century America indeed appears far
more attractive than its eighteenth-century predecessor, at least to me.
But in the end, that is my opinion. That opinion, moreover, might
easily change if, say, the war on terrorism results in an authoritarian
state ten years down the line. In fact, Eisgruber's indictment is, as a
general matter, surely correct on all counts. That said, one could run
thought experiments supposing different historical baselines that
would make this conclusion less certain. In fact, "fact" appears to
matter.
In consequence, history may at times actually have more bite than
Eisgruber acknowledges, even on his own terms. How deep the bite
will be, like history itself, is contingent. With regard to originalism,
constitutional text may usually be the best evidence of what framers
and ratifiers sought, but not always. More likely is that sources will
produce a range of answers: often very general, sometimes more
constraining, and once in a while quite specific. As historian Jack
Rakove notes, the history of the Founding will more often than not
reveal no more than the sketches of answers to discrete constitutional
questions, because the Founders in fact papered over important
disagreements in majestic generalities. 9 Even Rakove, however, may
overstate the impossibility of ever fixing specifics.
Suppose, for example, that the sources overwhelmingly showed that
the "Declare War" Clause was understood to mean that Congress
59. Rakove, Original Meanings, supra note 33, at 337-65.
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authorizes military engagement subject only to a presidential power to
"repel sudden attacks."6"' Suppose as well that the phrase "declare
war" - then or now - could as a matter of language also mean simply
announcing that hostilities now exist in international law.6 1 Likewise,
the balance of historical scholarship argues that the Eleventh
Amendment was never meant to embody some vague concept of
"sovereign immunity," but instead was aimed at limiting Federal court
jurisdiction and, more narrowly still, probably at doing so only in
diversity cases rather than Federal question suits.62 It is far from clear
why adopting either linguistic possibility fairly clearly rejected by We
the People should be permissible any more than it would be
appropriate to construe the admonition to "eat healthy" as advice to
dine on what is' "cool" if healthy came to have that possible
meaning-a position Eisgruber humorously rejects. (pp. 29-32).
Likewise tradition. Suppose here that the evidence, again
overwhelmingly, shows that American tradition even very broadly
defined has and continues to reject the claim that the state must allow
parents to deny their children life-saving medicine on religious
grounds. Now suppose that the Supreme Court declares such parental
authority to be a constitutional right based in part on the dissenting
practices of a few minority sects whose presence would be inevitable
in the history of a nation as large and diverse as the United States.
Or, in a similar vein, consider the Grimk6 sisters. As David Richards
has shown, these exceptional women of the antebellum Southern
aristocracy powerfully argued against a broad conception of "moral
slavery" that the Fourteenth Amendment should be seen as
encompassing, an interpretation that in turn should clear the way for
recognizing gay rights.63 This is an extremely innovative and attractive
formulation. One trouble, at least in terms of method, is that the
Grimk6s in their day were exceptional to the point of being outcasts.
Eisgruber might respond that adopting the Grimk6s, or the parentalist
60. See John Hart Ely, War and Responsibility:' Constitutional Lessons of
Vietnam and its Aftermath 3-10, 139-52 (1993); Louis Fisher, Presidential War Power
(1995); Harold Hongju Koh, The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power after
the Iran-Contra Affair 74-77 (1990); Treanor, Power to Declare War, supra note 12.
61. See Henry P. Monaghan, Presidential War-Making, 50 B.U. L. Rev. 19 (1970);
Eugene V. Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act, 50 Tex. L.
Rev. 833 (1972); John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The
Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 170 (1996).
62. See John V. Orth, The Judicial Power of the United States: The Eleventh
Amendment in American History (1993); William A. Fletcher, A Historical
Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative
Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 Stan. L. Rev.
1033 (1983); William A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh
Amendment: A Reply to Critics, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1261 (1989); John J. Gibbons, The
Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 Colum. L.
Rev. 1889 (1983).
63. David A. J. Richards, Women, Gays, and the Constitution: The Grounds for
Feminism and Gay Rights in Culture and Law (1998).
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minority sects, may nonetheless be legitimate on the grounds of
contemporary moral reasoning. It is, however, hard to see how such A
la carte selection of traditions that in context border on outlandish
enhances, rather than undermines, the democratic claim that the
Court is speaking on behalf of the American people.
As for theory, Eisgruber excels at fairly presenting potential
objections, then patiently countering them. There is, however, at least
one substantial problem that he does not fully identify. Confining
membership in an institution designed to speak the sense of the
American people on complex moral issues to a single elite seems a
grand lost opportunity. Surely such a body could only benefit from
the contributions of accomplished doctors, philosophers, artists and
activists on the model of the British House of Lords or better, the
more democratically accountable Irish Senead.
Confining membership to a legal elite, moreover, seems an
especially risky choice. Expertise in the law, to be sure, enhances the
ability of the Court to take the "strategic" steps that translate
principles into rules. But with that comes a host of disadvantages.
For one, a focus on rules can often lead to a certain moral obtuseness.
Eisgruber is right to note that the Court has not done a bad job in the
last fifty years; it is less clear that this assessment applies more
generally. This thought might inspire more confidence if the prior 100
years had not produced so many abominations, from Dred Scott
through Korematsu.M Nor is it as easy as it once was to consign the
Court's morally obtuse performance to the dark past. Any number of
recent cases violate the very prescriptions that Eisgruber advances.
Bowers,65 Lopez,66 Printz,"7 Adarand," Bush v. Gore," and the related
cases in between lend renewed support to the idea that it was the New
Deal, Warren, and Burger Courts that were aberrational, not the
other way around."'
For another problem, the American legal elite-at least as reflected
in the Supreme Court-remains horribly unrepresentative in terms of
race, class, gender, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, and even
geography. Only one is a person "of color"; only two are non-
Christian; and only two are women, the last reflecting a still fairly
recent and substantial change. However much their influence may be
64. Even a short list is truly sobering: Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856);
Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S.(16 Wall.) 36 (1872); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537 (1896); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); and Korernatsu v. United States,
319 U.S. 432 (1943).
65. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
66. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
67. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
68. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
69. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
70. See Kramer, We the Court, supra note 17.
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exaggerated, law clerks might theoretically provide the justices with a
window on a more diverse sampling of the American public. Yet it
would be surprising if the older, more insular group did much beyond
replicating itself, and there have been few surprises. As periodic press
"expos6s" suggest, the law clerk population itself remains severely
unrepresentative of the citizenry on almost any criterion.
Even if things may be improving on some of these fronts, in matters
such as diverse life experience the Court appears to be marching in
exactly the wrong direction. Not that long ago justices, regardless of
politics and ideology, brought to the Court careers of genuine
accomplishment in widely disparate fields, both in the law and outside
it as well. Among other things, Earl Warren had served as governor
of California; Hugo Black, a United States Senator; William 0.
Douglass, first chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission;
Felix Frankfurter, a leading academic; Byron White, Rhodes Scholar,
a professional sports star, and war hero; Thurgood Marshall, the
definitive civil rights lawyer. Backgrounds such as these gave the
Court at least a remembered access to many different and at times
clashing aspects of American life. Whether sufficient, judicial
appointments along these lines made the claim that the Justices could
speak on behalf of the American people-even in the considered,
principled, moral sense that Eisgruber seeks-plausible and plausibly
attractive.
Today, the typical justice sees all the variety that a law school, a
prestigious law firm, an appointive government position, or a lower
appellate judgeship have to offer. Eisgruber legitimately counters
that his theory is not meant to define the best institutional structure,
but merely to justify what we have. Even on those terms, the specter
of lawyers such as this offering the moral sense of the nation gives one
pause.
CONCLUSION
These critiques are nonetheless a measure of the book's great
success. Constitutional Self-Government opens disavowing any
aspirations "to the model of John Hart Ely's great work, Democracy
and Distrust." (p. 5). What Eisgruber means is that he has no aim "to
supply an easily grasped theory that tells judges how to decide every
issue that comes before them." (p. 6). Nor does he, given his theory
that the Constitution is an open-textured structure for ongoing
democratic argument, the Supreme Court included. The work
71. According to a recent report in USA Today: of 394 law clerks hired by the
current court, just seven were African-American, or 1.8%. Five were Hispanic (1%),
and eighteen were Asian (4.5%). One-fourth were women. As recently as 1999,
moreover, four Justices had not hired an African-American. Tony Mauro, The
hidden power behind the Supreme Court Justices give pivotal role to novice lawyers,
USA Today, March 13, 1998, at Al.
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nonetheless resembles Ely's in several other senses. It is lucid,
concise, and tautly reasoned. It is also exceptionally rich, original, and
wide ranging. Among many insights made in passing, the work as a
whole offers one of the most powerful arguments available for a
vigorous, principled judiciary. And far more than Ely's work,
Constitutional Self-Government offers a distinctively measured and
thoughtful consideration of the role that history could and should play
in the process. For lawyers and historians alike, it is a slim volume
that should generate substantial discussion.
